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SERIOUS SIDE EFFECTS MAY OCCUR:
THE PAINFUL SYMPTOMS OF
EVOLVING TORT LIABILITY
WILLIAM H.T. RICE
I. INTRODUCTION
The evolution of modern tort law has given rise to a problematic body of
precedent for cases involving injured consumers of generic medications, when
those consumers are harmed by side-effects not included on a medication’s
warning label.1 A restrictive combination of federal preemption and bedrock tort
law principles has all but eliminated access to judicial remedy for consumers
who have been injured by inadequate warning labels.2 In short, most state and
federal courts have been reluctant to hold either the generic or name-brand
manufacturers liable for harm that stems from faulty labeling on generic
medications.3 Generic companies are generally protected from claims related to
labeling by the shield of federal preemption, as the generic labels are dictated by
Food and Drug Administration regulations.4 The name-brand manufacturers
have largely been absolved of liability under basic negligence theories because,
in these cases, the name-brand manufacturers did not produce the medication that
was consumed, therefore establishing causation has been problematic.5 These
two precedential bulwarks have facilitated the expansion of a burgeoning
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1. See generally Brian Wolfman & Anne King, Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett and Its
Implications, 82 U.S.L.Wk. 1, 1–18 (2013); see also Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472
(2013); PLIVA v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604 (2011).
2. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472; PLIVA, 564 U.S. 604; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§281, 298,
301, 395, 402A, 402B, 430, 431, 435, 440, 441, 442 (AM. LAW INST. 1979);
3. See generally Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472; PLIVA, 564 U.S. 604; Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d
353 (Ala. 2014); Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So. 3d 649 (2014).
4. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§281, 430, 431 (AM. LAW INST 1979).
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potential plaintiff pool, one that is helplessly underequipped in its fight for
justice.
This paper highlights landmark manufacturer liability cases and proceeds
by exploring causes of action that could provide much needed judicial redress.
Ultimately, this paper examines the Maryland Court of Appeals’ legal
maneuvering in a recent failure-to-warn case which could alleviate the painful
side-effects of evolving tort liability.
II. BACKGROUND
When a consumer is harmed by the reasonable use or foreseeable misuse of
a defective product, the product manufacturer may be held strictly liable.6 This
legal standard, enunciated by Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme
Court in his concurrence for Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,7 is the foundation
of modern day strict product liability.8 Due to the wide acceptance of this
principle, companies now design, manufacture and distribute products with an
understanding that they could be liable for harm suffered as a result of a
customer’s reasonable use or foreseeable misuse of the manufacturer’s product.9
Both the common law and governing statutes put manufacturers on notice
that they are responsible for harm stemming from their defective products.10 The
development of this area of law has resulted in distinct guidelines that dictate
how plaintiffs may attempt to receive fair compensation from manufacturers for
harm created by the manufacturers.11 When bringing a product liability claim,
plaintiffs are first required to identify the particular defect that caused their
injury. Product defects typically fall into one of three categories: (i) design
defects, (ii) manufacturing defects and (iii) warning defects.12 This paper focuses
primarily on warning defects, as failure to warn actions are the central tort claims
available to consumers injured by inadequate medication warning labels.13

6. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
7. Id.
8. Id.; Gary T. Schwartz, Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REV. 435 (1979).
9. Keith N. Hylton, The Law and Economics of Products Liability, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2457,
2463 (2013) (explaining how economic incentives paired with the reliance rationale has created a
relationship between consumers and manufacturers that provides notice to manufacturers that they can be
held liable for their defective products).
10. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472 (2013); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S.
604 (2011); Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353 (Iowa 2014); Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So.3d 649
(Ala. 2014).
11. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472; PLIVA, 564 U.S. 604; Huck, 850 N.W.2d 353; Wyeth 159 So.3d 649.
12. HARRY SHULMAN, FLEMING JAMES, JR., OSCAR GRAY, DONALD GIFFORD, LAW OF TORTS –
CASES AND MATERIALS, 573–609 (6th ed. 2015).
13. Id.; See cases cited supra notes 4 & 10.
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Personal injury claims resulting from a failure to warn have developed
through the evolution of common law as an action that sounded in negligence.14
These “negligent failure to warn claims” were founded upon harm caused by the
negligent conduct of a defendant.15 For such an action to be viable under a
negligence standard, the defendant must have breached a duty owed to the
plaintiff by failing to exercise reasonable care in the provision of warnings and
that failure must have been a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s harm.16 “A
defendant whose conduct creates a risk of physical or emotional harm can fail to
exercise reasonable care by failing to warn of the danger if: (1) the defendant
knows or has reason to know: (a) of that risk; and (b) that those encountering the
risk will be unaware of it; and (2) a warning might be effective in reducing the
risk of harm.17 In accordance with tort law precedent, “failure to warn” product
liability claims arise “when one who supplies chattel for use by another knows,
or should realize, that chattel is, or is likely to be, dangerous for use for which it
is supplied and fails to exercise reasonable care to warn the user of its dangerous
condition.”18 “Failure to warn is defined as the absence of, or inadequacy of,
warnings accompanying a product which causes harm.”19 “To establish liability
for a failure to warn, [a plaintiff] must show that ‘a warning is necessary to make
a product . . . reasonably safe, suitable and fit for its intended use,’ that [the
defendant(s)] failed to provide such a warning, and that that failure was a
proximate cause of [plaintiff’s] injury.”20 This theory of liability has been
codified within the Third Restatement, which further reinforces the view that “a
product will be ‘defective’ by reason of a lack or inadequacy of warnings or
instructions for safe usage ‘when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable
14. See Delmarva Power & Light Co. v. Burrows, 435 A.2d 716, 718 (1981) (demonstrating that, in
Delaware, duties are measured in terms of reasonableness and that a person can breach that duty by not
protecting against an event that a reasonably prudent person would protect against, therefore, failing to
warn of foreseeable danger can give rise to a negligence claim); see also Sneed v. Lions Club of Murphy,
Inc., 273 N.C. 98, 100, 159 S.E.2d 770, 772 (1968) (holding that, under North Carolina law, the owner of
a public pool is under a duty to install and maintain proper signs warning patrons of dangerous depths of
the water, and that failure to so warn may constitute negligence); United States v. Washington, 351 F.2d
913, 916–17 (1965) (reiterating that there is often a legal duty to communicate or to attempt to
communicate adequate warnings of existing, foreseeable hazards and that failing to do so may be
negligent).
15. Id.
16. E.g., Pa. R.R. Co. v. Goldenbaum, 269 A.2d 229, 233 (1970) (citing Jones v. Pa R.R. Co., 61
A.2d 691 (1948) (stating, “[t]he issue you must decide then, in the light of the principles of law I have
stated to you, is whether or not the defendant was negligent in providing adequate warning devices at the
intersection and, if so, whether such negligence was a proximate cause of the accident.”).
17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM, § 18 (AM.
LAW. INST. 2010).
18. Potts v. Uap-Ga Ag Chem, Inc., 567 S.E.2d 316, 321 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
19. Winifred Weitsen Boyle, There’s No Smoking Gun: Cities Should Not Sue the Firearm Industry,
25 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215, 231 n. 96 (2000)
20. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 524 (1992).

102

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 22:99

instructions or warnings by the seller or other distributor … and the omission of
the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.’”21 In regard
to guidance aimed specifically at the special liability of drug manufacturers,
comment k to Restatement § 402A effectively illustrates the quintessential
importance of adequate warnings, explaining that that a dangerous but useful
medication that is “properly prepared[] and accompanied by proper directions
and warning, is not defective nor is it unreasonably dangerous.”22
Without question, the tripartite defect model effectively governed drug
manufacturer liability while the market consisted largely of name-brand
producers.23 As the pharmaceutical marketplace has grown more diverse,
tensions have begun to arise due to influential shifts in the controlling market
dynamics.24 Many scholars have debated the arduous Food and Drug
Administration’s (hereinafter “FDA”) “new drug” approval process,25 with
critics alleging that the threat of litigation created by tort liability has contributed
to the development of excessively burdensome approval procedures.26 Critics
highlight how product defect liability plays a large role in the growing costs
associated with earning FDA approval and securing health care provider
insurance, which are passed on to consumers through soaring medication prices
and insurance premiums.27 In opposition to those critics, proponents of namebrand manufacturer liability argue that holding name-brand companies
responsible for harm they cause is essential for ensuring adequate consumer
protections.28

21. Martin A. Kotler, Reconceptualizing Strict Liability in Tort: An Overview, 50 VAND. L. REV.
555, 596 (1997) (citing the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c)).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
23. Name-brand producers are companies that first bring medications to market by completing
lengthy and expensive Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) approval processes. Generic drug
producers are the companies that market medicine which is equivalent to a name-brand product in dosage,
strength, route of administration, quality, performance and intended use, but does not carry the brand
name.
Generic
Drug
Facts,
FDA
(June
4,
2018),
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/GenericDrugs/u
cm167991.htm.
24. Maura Calsyn & Thomas Huelskoetter, The FDA Is Not the Problem: Why Undermining the Drug
Approval Process Is Not The Answer to High Drug Prices, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 9, 2016),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/reports/2016/03/09/132850/fda-is-not-the-problem/.
25. Id.
26. Nina J. Crimm, A Tax Proposal to Promote Pharmacologic Research, to Encourage
Conventional Prescription Drug Innovation and Improvement, and to Reduce Product Liability Claims,
29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1007 (1994); Victor E. Schwartz, Phil Goldberg, Cary Silverman, Warning:
Shifting Liability to Manufacturers of Brand-Name Medicines When the Harm Was Allegedly Caused by
Generic Drugs has Severe Side Effect, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1835 (2013).
27. Id.
28. George Mason Law and Economics Center, Congressional Civil Justice Academy Debate:
Inventing New Liability? Who Should We Blame When Generic Drugs Harm Patients?, VIMEO (Feb. 9,
2018), https://vimeo.com/255119753 (highlighting arguments regarding how to maintain reasonable
consumer protections in the drug manufacturer context).
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Regardless of any impact that tort liability has had, due to the significant
time commitment and financial resources required to bring medicine to market,
name-brand medications are inherently sold at steep prices.29 High medication
purchase prices allow name-brand companies to compensate for the large upfront costs they shoulder developing medicine for public use.30 While these
prices manifest sound economics for name-brand manufacturers, they can make
it difficult for average and low-income individuals that are lacking adequate
insurance coverage for prescription drugs to purchase necessary medication.31
To alleviate supply-side deficiencies and unreasonable medication costs,
Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
of 1984, known as the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.32 The purpose of this law
was to make medications more affordable and accessible.33 Congress sought to
bring down medication prices by modifying the approval process required for
generic versions of FDA approved medication and allowing for “Abbreviated
New Drug Applications” (hereinafter “ANDA”).34 Under Hatch-Waxman, a
generic medication may be approved for use without completing the onerous
New Drug Application process35 (hereinafter “NDA”) that name-brand
manufacturers must finish, provided the generic drug is bioequivalent to an FDA
approved name-brand drug.36 Hatch-Waxman prohibits generic drug
manufacturers from using different active ingredients or altering the warning
label that the FDA approved for the name-brand medication.37 On the whole, the
benefits that Hatch-Waxman provides for generic companies has helped address
price discrimination problems in a plethora of ways. Generic companies may
29. Aaron Kesselheim et al., The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United States Origins and
Prospects for Reform, 316 JAMA 858–71 (August 23/30, 2016), https://phhp-bahealthsciencenew.sites.medinfo.ufl.edu/files/2016/09/jsc1600151.pdf.
30. Rick Mullin, Cost to Develop New Pharmaceutical Drug Not Exceeds $2.5B, SCI. AM., (Nov. 24,
2014),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/cost-to-develop-new-pharmaceutical-drug-nowexceeds-2-5b/; Jim Logan, The Economics of Drug Pricing, THE UC SANTA BARBARA CURRENT (Nov.
23, 2015), http://www.news.ucsb.edu/2015/016151/science-drug-pricing.
31. TOPHER SPIRO ET AL., CTR FOR AM. PROGRESS, ENOUGH IS ENOUGH: THE TIME HAS COME TO
ADDRESS SKY-HIGH DRUG PRICES, 1, 18–19 (Sept. 2015), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/15131852/DrugPricingReforms-report1.pdf; AM.’S HEALTH INS. PLANS, HIGH
PRICES OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS INCREASE COSTS FOR EVERYONE, https://www.ahip.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/05/High-Cost_Drugs_Slide_Deck.pdf.
32. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984); S. REP. NO. 98–547 at 1585 (1984); Allen Sokal & Bart A. Gerstenblith, The Hatch-Waxman
Act: Encouraging Innovation and Generic Drug Competition, FINNEGAN CURRENT TOPICS IN MEDICINAL
CHEMISTRY (Winter 2010), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/the-hatch-waxman-act-encouraginginnovation-and-generic-drug.html.
33. Id.
34. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984).
35. Id. at 1585–86.
36. Id. at 1585–91.
37. Id.
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now sell medications initially developed by name-brand companies without
going through the same expensive research and development phase.38 This
allows generic drug companies to sell their medication at significantly reduced
prices which, in turn, makes the generic medication accessible to a broader
market of people.39
Before diving into cases that shape the issues related to generic medication
failure to warn claims, it is important to briefly review preemption and the
broader manufacturer liability landscape. Federal preemption is derived from the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,40 which establishes that
state laws contrary to or interfering with the laws of Congress are invalid.41
Federal preemption comes in three main flavors: express preemption, conflict
preemption, and field preemption.42 The aspects of preemption that are of
particular import for inadequate warning label suits are conflict and field
preemption.43 Conflict preemption occurs when a state and federal law conflict
in a way that makes it impossible to comply with both simultaneously, or because
the state law interferes with the core purpose of the federal law.44 Field
preemption occurs when the extent of federal regulation is so extensive that it
fully occupies the chosen field.45 To prove field preemption, it must be
demonstrated that the federal law was intended to occupy a field in a manner that
leaves no room for any additional state regulation.46
Those who oppose allowing inadequate generic medication warning claims
to proceed against name-brand manufacturers argue that either one or both of the
aforementioned forms of preemption apply to actions based on harms stemming
from faulty generic medication warnings.47 Proponents for allowing such claims
to proceed against name-brand manufacturers counter with a two-fold argument
that federal regulation of medication does not preempt state tort claims.48 As the

38. Donald Dietz, White Paper: Generic Drug Pricing: Understanding the Impact, 1, 2 (2015),
http://www.wolterskluwercdi.com/sites/default/files/documents/white-papers/ms-generic-pricinginfo.pdf.
39. Id.
40. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
41. See infra Part III.
42. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 479–80, 512 (explaining the various forms
of federal preemption).
43. See infra note 161.
44. Amanda G. Lewis, Federal Preemption of State and Local Laws: State and Local Efforts to
Impose Sanctions on employers of
Unauthorized
Aliens, 1, 6 (May 2008),
https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/careerservices/Federal%20Preemption%20of%20State%20and%20Local%20Laws.pdf.
45. Id. at 7.
46. Id.
47. Wolfman & King, supra note 1.
48. Id.
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Court reiterated in Wyeth v. Levine,49 there are “two cornerstones of our
preemption jurisprudence” that control issues regarding federally regulated
medication manufacturers: Congressional intent and federal recognition of police
powers reserved by the states. 50 As the controlling medication labeling laws do
not expressly preempt tort claims, and there is a presumption against interfering
with state police powers, the cornerstones of preemption indicate that pursuit of
failure to warn claims resulting from inadequate generic medication labels are
viable.
Two early cases that had meaningful impacts on the expansion of
manufacturer liability were Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.51 and
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.52 These precedents provided for strict
liability in both contract and tort law, yet ultimately established that tort law
principles, not contract law principles, should govern claims regarding defective
products.53 Henningsen involved the development of strict liability as a function
of contract law, rather than tort law.54 In that case, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey, for all intents and purposes, created strict liability through enforcing an
implied warranty of merchantability without a privity requirement.55 This
decision was followed by holdings across most jurisdictions which “adopted a
tort version of strict liability independent of warranty theory.”56 The shift
towards tort law strict liability was exemplified by Greenman, a case decided by
the Supreme Court of California, which definitively positioned tort law as the
proper grounds for analyzing product defect personal injury claims.57 These
cases set the stage for modern developments in manufacturer liability tort
common law.
A more recent manufacturer liability case is Cipollone v. Liggett Group.58
This preeminent case centered around whether injured cigarette smokers could
hold cigarette companies liable for labeling their product in a manner that did not
adequately warn of the dangers associated with smoking.59 While the case
ultimately resulted in a byzantine holding, it addressed many facets of
49. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
50. Id. at 565.
51. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960) (involving plaintiffs who were injured in a car accident that was caused
by a steering defect in their Plymouth Plaza 6 Club Sedan ten days after delivery).
52. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (involving a plaintiff who sustained a head injury while using a
Shopsmith combination saw, drill, and wood lathe tool in accordance with the instructions for that
machine).
53. DAVID G. OWEN & MARY J. DAVIS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY CASES AND MATERIALS,
153–60 (7th ed. 2015).
54. SHULMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 583–86.
55. OWEN & DAVIS, supra at 53; Henningsen, 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
56. SHULMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 583–87.
57. OWEN & DAVIS, supra at 53; Greenman, 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
58. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
59. Id.
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preemption and misrepresentation that help illuminate the failure to warn issue.
Importantly, Cipollone supports the argument that misrepresentations are not
necessarily preempted in the same way that other tortious actions are.60 In
reaching its decision the Court emphasized the importance of the presumption
against preemption of state police powers, that federal warning label regulations
do not automatically preempt the entire regulatory field or foreclose obligations
imposed under state law, and that there is no general inherent conflict between
federal regulation of warning labels and the continued vitality of state common
law tort claims.61 The underpinning of this holding was grounded in “the state
law duty not to make false statements of material facts.”62 The court held that the
manufacturer’s duty was not predicated on any specific provision of the federal
regulation, but rather grounded in a more general duty to provide accurate and
non-deceitful information.63 The court determined that allowing for a breach of
this duty to be actionable at the state level was conducive to the federal regulatory
scheme, and that it did not create the feared “diverse, nonuniform, and confusing
standards.”64 This holding expressly allows for the avoidance of preemption in
faulty labeling misrepresentation cases.65 As preemption is one of the two main
hurdles that need to be overcome to hold medication manufacturers liable, this
approach can be particularly useful when attempting to reveal a theory of liability
that alleviates the suffering of countless harmed generic drug consumers.
III. ANALYSIS OF DECISIONAL LAW
This paper now advances by providing analysis of noteworthy cases related
to issues facing harmed consumers of mislabeled generic medications. This
section reviews two Supreme Court holdings that handicap consumers’ ability to
recover from generic manufacturers, two significant state court decisions that
may be used to support name-brand manufacturer liability, three recent divergent
state court decisions that were entered between 2017 and 2018, and a landmark
Maryland Court of Appeals failure to warn case that may provide a framework
which could allow harmed consumers of mislabeled generic medications to
recover from name-brand manufacturers. The section concludes by noting two
contexts where innovative claims rooted in misrepresentation and failure to warn
have been gaining popularity.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 531.
Id. 531–32.
Id. at 529.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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A. Supreme Court Decisions
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing consolidated claims from two plaintiffs and
centered around the respective liability of generic and name-brand drug
manufacturers.66 Ms. Mensing and Ms. Demahy were prescribed Reglan67 to
combat diabetic gastroparesis in 2001 and 2002.68 Instead of receiving the namebrand version of this drug from their pharmacists, they each received and
consumed generic versions of metoclopramide.69 After both women took this
medication as prescribed for several years, they suffered severe side-effects that
the medication label did not adequately warn about.70 Specifically, testing had
suggested that “long term use of metoclopramide carries a risk of [developing]
tardive dyskinesia71 far greater than that indicated on the label.”72 The women
developed tardive dyskinesia after their prolonged use of metoclopramide.73 At
the time of the lawsuit, studies demonstrated that up to twenty-nine percent of
patients who took metoclopramide for several years developed this condition.74
In their suit against the generic drug manufacturers, Ms. Mensing and Ms.
Demahy alleged wrongful omission and failure to warn about the potential sideeffects.75 The generic manufacturer defendants responded by arguing that they
could not be held responsible for the warnings on the label because federal
regulations afforded them no ability to modify the language of the labels on the
generic medication.76 FDA regulations required that generic drug manufacturers
copy the labels and warnings provided by name-brand manufacturers.77 The
defendants asserted that “it was impossible to simultaneously comply with both
federal law and any state tort-law duty that required them to use a different label”
than the name-brand manufacturer.78

66. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 608 (2011).
67. A name-brand metoclopramide, which, as defined by the Mayo Clinic, is a medication used to
treat the symptoms of a certain type of stomach problem called gastroparesis in patients with diabetes. It
works by increasing the movements or contractions of the stomach and intestines. Drugs and Supplements:
Metoclopramide
(Oral
Route),
MAYO
CLINIC,
https://www.mayoclinic.org/drugssupplements/metoclopramide-oral-route/description/drg-20064784 (last updated Oct. 1, 2018).
68. PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 610.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. David Daiomov, Tardive Dyskinesia, COLL. OF PSYCHIATRIC & NEUROLOGIC PHARMACISTS,
(CPNP),
https://www.nami.org/Learn-More/Mental-Health-Conditions/Related-Conditions/TardiveDyskinesia (last updated Jan. 2016) (explaining that this ailment is a severe neurological disorder that
impairs movement).
72. PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 610
73. Id.
74. Id. at 609.
75. Id. at 611.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 610.
78. Id.
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The United States Supreme Court agreed with the defendant manufacturer
and held that generic drug makers cannot be held liable for a failure to warn when
they have fully complied with FDA regulations.79 In making this decision, the
Court appeared weary of infringing on the rightful actions of co-equal branches
of government. Justice Thomas stated that the Court deferred to the FDA’s
interpretation of its own “changes-being-affected”80 and generic medication
labeling regulations.81 Although the Court specifically noted that the tort law
and federal regulation pairing dealt Mensing, Demahy, and others similarly
situated, an “unfortunate hand,” it ultimately decided that holding generic drug
manufacturers liable for doing exactly as they were required to do would be
unreasonable and unfair.82 In this case, federal preemption was dispositive for
determining where liability could fall when evaluating whether generic
manufacturers could be held liable for inadequate warning labels.
Importantly, the PLIVA decision was directed towards generic
manufacturers and not name-brand manufacturers. The PLIVA holding restricted
means by which injured consumers of generic medication could hold generic
drug manufacturers liable for harms suffered as a result of the generic
manufacturer’s failure to warn. Shortly after this decision, another blow was
struck at the federal level against generic drug consumers seeking to hold generic
manufacturer’s liable.
Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett83 began with Ms. Bartlett being
prescribed and subsequently using Clinoril84 to alleviate chronic shoulder pain.85
Unbeknownst to her, Ms. Bartlett was subjected to the possibility of developing
toxic epidermal necrolysis, a debilitating side-effect of the medication.86
Unfortunately, soon after beginning to use Clinoril, Ms. Bartlett was plagued
with an acute case of toxic epidermal necrolysis which resulted in sixty-percent
of her skin being destroyed.87
Ms. Bartlett was left severely disfigured, almost blinded and struggling with
physical disabilities.88 She sued Mutual Pharmaceutical on failure to warn and
design defect grounds, but the District Court dismissed the failure to warn claim

79. Id. at 619–20.
80. A major change requires the submission of a supplement and approval by FDA prior to
distribution of the drug product made using the change. This type of supplement is called, and should be
clearly labeled, a Supplement - Changes Being Effected in 30 Days. 21 C.F.R § 314.70 (c)(3) (2018).
81. PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 615–17.
82. Id. at 625–26.
83. 570 U.S. 472 (2013).
84. A generic version of the anti-inflammatory drug, Sulindac. Clinoril, DRUGS.COM (June 3, 2015),
https://www.drugs.com/cdi/clinoril.html.
85. Bartlett, 570 U.S. at 477–78.
86. Id. at 477–78
87. Id.
88. Id. at 478.
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based on her doctor’s “admi[ssion] that he had not read the box label or insert.”89
The doctor failed to properly inform that plaintiff and the plaintiff did not read
the label or the informative insert that was provided with the generic drug.
Ultimately, only the design-defect claim was tried.90 A jury found that Mutual
was liable to the plaintiff for $21 million.91
Mutual appealed the decision, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court’s ruling, holding that the Food and Drug Administration’s regulations did
not preempt the state tort law design defect claims.92 The court distinguished this
case from PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, arguing that because the risks and side effects
were known to the manufacturer, the generic producer could have elected to not
manufacture and sell the drug at all, thereby complying with both federal and
state law.93 The case was subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court, which
reversed the First Circuit decision, holding that state-law warning label defect
claims are preempted by federal law.94
In a 5–4 opinion written by Justice Alito, the Court held that state law
design-defect claims based on the adequacy of a medication’s warnings are
preempted by federal regulations that prohibit generic drug manufacturers from
independently changing FDA approved medication labels.95 The principal
support for the Court’s holding was the Supremacy Clause and the implied
preemption arising thereunder when “it is impossible for a private party to
comply with both state and federal requirements.”96 New Hampshire state law
obligated manufacturers to place stronger warnings on the generic drug labels, a
requirement that was impossible to satisfy in light of the federal labeling
restriction requirements.97 The New Hampshire law was preempted by the
Supremacy Clause, which establishes that federal law supersedes that of the
states.98
The Bartlett decision reinforced the argument that generic drug
manufacturers cannot be held liable for inadequate medication labeling when
federal pharmaceutical regulation preempts the underlying state law claim. As
detailed in the opinions for both PLIVA and Bartlett, a clear indicator that a state
claim against a generic drug manufacturer is ripe for federal preemption is when
it is impossible for the generic manufacturer to meet both state and federal legal

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 479.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 476.
Id. at 475–76.
Id. at 475.
Id.
See supra notes 40 & 41.
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obligations.99 The key difference between Bartlett and its predecessor, PLIVA,
was that Bartlett undermined the ability to levy a design defect claim against
generic manufacturers while PLIVA attacked the viability of failure-to-warn
claims against generic manufacturers.100 The outcomes of these two cases force
the hand of any attorney seeking to find redress for injured generic drug
consumers to take aim at name-brand manufacturer’s rather than generic
companies.
Justices Ginsberg and Sotomayor dissented from the majority in Bartlett,
arguing that state law should not be preempted without evidence that Congress
intended to supersede state law, especially in fields historically dominated by
states.101 Justice Sotomayor argued that Congress’ objective in creating the law
prohibiting alterations to generic medication labels was to improve consumer
protection and that disallowing additional state tort protections does not further
the consumer protection goal.102 In fact, “[t]racing the history of federal drug
regulation from the Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906,103 up to the Food Drug
and Cosmetic Act and its major amendments,104 the Court explained that federal
drug law and state common-law liability have long been understood to operate
in tandem to promote consumer safety.”105 It follows that state law requiring
adequate warnings on labels does not frustrate the protection purpose, rather, it
complements it. Accordingly, the New Hampshire design-defect laws effectively
acted as an incentive to avoid strict-liability, not a mandate that product labels
must be altered, and therefore the law should not have been struck down. The
two dissenting Justices articulated that state laws which protect consumers by
requiring adequate medication warnings are not irreconcilable with federal laws
that provide guidelines for generic drug production and labeling.106 While this
reasoning is from a dissent, the concept of cooperative federal and state consumer
protections is widely recognized.107
These Supreme Court rulings largely prevented injured generic drug
consumers from holding generic manufacturers liable for harmful mislabeled
medication. In reaching their decisions, the Justice’s legal analysis centered on
99. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 619–20 (2011); Bartlett, 570 U.S. at 501.
100. Wolfman & King, supra note 1, at 5.
101. Bartlett, 570 U.S. at 498.
102. Id. at 517.
103. Pure Food and Drug Act., 59 Pub. L. No. 59–384, 34 Stat.768 (1906).
104. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984).
105. Bartlett, 570 U.S. at 498; Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 566–68 (2009).
106. Bartlett, 570 U.S. at 498.
107. Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90–321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (commonly referred to
as the “Fair Credit Reporting Act”); Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95–109, 91 Stat. 874
(1977); see generally state adoptions of the Revised Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 75th
HANDBOOK OF THE NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF
THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING 298, 315 (1966).
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the liability of the generic company, rather than that of the name-brand
manufacturer.108 In turning to the state court holdings, it becomes clear that while
there are limited ways to find a generic manufacturer liable, avenues which could
provide redress for injured consumers of generic medications lead towards namebrand manufacturer liability.
B. Early State Court Decisions
Huck v. Wyeth, Inc.,109 a recent Iowa case, addressed the generic
manufacturer versus name-brand manufacturer liability issue head-on.110 As in
PLIVA, the plaintiff in this case suffered serious side effects after taking a generic
version of Reglan for several years.111 She claimed the warning on the label was
insufficient in relation to the potential harm, therefor the generic drug company
had failed to adequately warn customers about the side effects associated with
using their medication.112 The primary issue in this case was that the generic
manufacturer had not strengthened its warning label in accordance with changes
made to the name-brand label in 2004.113 Since the generic medication’s label
was not correctly updated with the proper “changes being affected,” many
consumers of the generic drug were unaware of the medication’s significant
risks.114
While Huck was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided
PLIVA.115 Relying on PLIVA and an earlier Iowa case, Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly,116
the Huck court analyzed whether claims against either the name-brand or generic
manufacturer might be successful.117 Applying the rules reiterated in PLIVA and
Mulcahy, the Iowa district court dismissed Huck’s claims against all
manufacturers.118 The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed this dismissal.119 The
district court and court of appeals dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against the
name-brand manufacturer because, to satisfy the causation element, Iowa law
required that the defendant’s drug, not the defendant’s warning label, be the
cause of plaintiff’s injury.120 In this case, the generic drug maker manufactured
the physical medication, not the brand name-brand company, therefore the court
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See generally Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472 (2013); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604 (2011).
850 N.W.2d 353 (Iowa 2014).
Id.
Id. at 359.
Id. at 363–66.
Id.
Id.
See generally PLIVA, Inc., v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604 (2011).
386 N.W.2d 67, 76 (Iowa 1986).
Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 364–65, 370; PLIVA, 564 U.S. 604; Mulcahy, 386 N.W.2d at 76.
Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 356.
Id.
Id.
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held the name-brand manufacturer could not be liable.121 The lower courts held
that the plaintiff’s claims were preempted by federal law.122 The Court of
Appeal’s decision was submitted, and accepted, for review by the Iowa Supreme
Court.123
The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the decision in part, allowing some of
the claims to proceed against the generic manufacturer.124 The Iowa Supreme
Court found a narrow path around the federal preemption argument.125 The court
referenced numerous federal decisions and regulations in concluding that
common law tort claims against generic manufacturers based on inadequate
warnings are not preempted to the extent that the generic manufacturer failed to
implement stronger warnings approved by the FDA in 2004.126
Citing Cipollone, the Huck court found that “there is no general, inherent
conflict between federal pre-emption [sic] of state warning requirements and the
continued vitality of state common-law damages actions.”127 This contention
enhanced the court’s argument that it was permissible for tort law claims to
proceed against negligent manufacturers even when there may be federal
regulations related to the subject matter of the tort action. In reaching its decision,
the court nimbly navigated through a web of preemption triggers to allow the
generic manufacturer to be held liable. They reasoned:
If Huck’s claims against PLIVA do not require the company to change its
labeling to differ from that of the approved label, they are not preempted.
[citation omitted] (“[O]ur task remains to identify whether [plaintiff’s] claims
are predicated upon labeling and packaging requirements in addition to and
different from those required by [federal law].”).128
Finding that because Huck’s claim only required PLIVA, Inc. to conform
its label to the most recently FDA approved label, the claims not only were valid,
they supported the mission of the federal regulation.129
The court relied on Wyeth v. Levine130 and Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc.131 in its
analysis of how state tort claims should be able to proceed against drug
manufacturers.132 Levine recognized that Congress has not provided a federal
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 364–66.
126. Id.
127. Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 366 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518(1992)).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 364–65 (citing Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc., 711 F.3d 578, 584 (6th Cir. 2013), “[C]ompliance
with federal and state duties was not just possible; it was required.”).
130. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
131. 711 F.3d 578.
132. Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 357–58.

2019]

SERIOUS SIDE EFFECTS MAY OCCUR

113

remedy for consumers harmed by prescription drugs and, as such, “state law
offers an additional, and important, layer of consumer protection that
complements FDA regulation.”133 The Levine court explained how state tort suits
help reveal drug hazards and incentivize the prompt disclosure of discovered
safety risks by drug manufacturers.134 Additionally, these claims create a
financial motivation for injured consumers to come forward with information
about harms they sustained, thereby potentially helping address dangerous faulty
labeling issues.135 In emphasizing the importance of allowing tort claims that can
hold manufacturers accountable, the court noted that “[f]ailure-to-warn actions,
in particular, lend force to the FDCA’s premise that manufacturers, not the FDA,
bear primary responsibility for their drug labeling at all times.”136 Notably, the
Court in Levine clearly established that claims against name-brand
manufacturers are not preempted by federal law.137 The Fulgenzi court also
grappled with the differences between name-brand and generic medication
manufacturer liability.138 In evaluating the main thrust of the FDCA, the court
singled out increased usage of generic drugs and the attendant lessening of costs
for consumers as “[t]he most easily identifiable policy.”139 The court noted that
“[p]ermitting state tort actions to go forward against generic-drug manufacturers
[rather than brand manufacturers] . . . would increase costs and reduce usage,”140
practically defeating the central purpose of generic alternatives to name-brand
medications. Recognizing the need to ensure consumer protection, the Fulgenzi
court referenced the PLIVA dissenters’ observation that “the inability to sue for
inadequate warnings may actually reduce consumer demand.” That being said,
the Fulgenzi court did not endorse a correct way to protect consumers of generic
medication, rather it explained that “[t]his is an empirical question, and we
should not affirmatively answer on the basis of mere speculation about
Congressional purposes.”141
With the Levine and Fulgenzi holdings factoring into its analysis, the Huck
court appeared to be divided regarding imposing liability on the name-brand
manufacturer. The majority ultimately held that the name-brand manufacturer

133. See Levine, 555 U.S. at 579 (noting additionally that, “[i]f Congress thought state-law suits posed
an obstacle to its objectives, it surely would have enacted an express pre-emption [sic] provision at some
point during the FDCA’s 70-year history”); see also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 451
(2005).
134. Levine, 555 U.S. at 579.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Levine, 555 U.S. at 581.
138. 711 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2013).
139. Id. at 585.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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cannot be liable when the plaintiff only consumed the generic drug.142 Citing
back to Mulcahy, the court applied Iowa law which required that the plaintiff
establish their injury was “caused by a product sold or supplied by the
defendant.”143 This long-standing requirement barred Ms. Huck’s recovery from
the name-brand manufacturers of a medication she, in one sense, never used.
Under Iowa law at the time of this decision, manufacturers only owed a duty to
consumers that are harmed by use of that specific manufacturer’s products.144
The court asserted that they would “not contort Iowa’s tort law in order to create
liability for brand manufacturers” and that “the unfairness [to potential plaintiffs]
resulting from PLIVA is best addressed by the Congress or FDA.”145
The court’s holding provided a narrow avenue allowing recovery against
generic manufacturers that had not met the requisite FDCA standards.146 As a
result of the generic manufacturer’s failure to match its warning label to the label
on the name-brand medication, the generic manufacturer was open to liability.147
“Huck’s claims fit into a “narrow gap”: she [was] suing for conduct that
violate[d] the FDCA, but she [was] not suing because the conduct violate[d] the
FDCA.”148 While a positive outcome for injured consumers in this unique
situation, the holding in Huck did not provide a remedy generally for injured
consumers of mislabeled generic medications when those medication warning
labels satisfy the required federal drug regulations. The support Huck provides
for holding name-brand manufacturers liable is similar to the backing provided
by Levine, that being endorsement of the concept that state claims should be used
in concert with federal regulations, not barred by them.149
The first case fully endorsing protection for injured consumers of
mislabeled generic medications did not arise until three years after Huck. In
2014, the Alabama Supreme court decided Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks,150 ruling that
under a breach of duty to warn theory, name-brand manufacturers can be liable
for harm caused by generic versions of their medication.151 Mr. Weeks brought
suit against drug manufacturers for injuries he sustained due to his long-term use
of a generic version of Reglan.152 Mr. Weeks’ harm stemmed from inaccurate

142.
143.
1986)).
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Huck v. Wyeth, 850 N.W.2d 353, 381–82 (Iowa 2014).
Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 381–82 (quoting Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly, & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67, 69 (Iowa
Id. at 371.
Id. at 381 (citing PLIVA, Inc., v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604 (2011)).
Id. at 370.
Id.
Id. at 369 (citing In re Medtronic, Inc., 623 F.3d 1200, 1204 (8th Cir. 2010)).
Id. at 357–58.
159 So.3d 649 (2014).
Id.
Id. at 653.
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labeling on a generic drug and an alleged misinformation campaign.153 These
two occurrences led to Mr. Weeks’s physician prescribing medication without
knowing the complete array of potential side-effects.154 After using the generic
medication, Mr. Weeks developed tardive dyskinesia, a permanent movement
disorder.155 Mr. Weeks alleged the name-brand manufacturer had knowledge the
medication could significantly increase the likelihood that a patient would
develop tardive dyskinesia and the manufacturer failed to adequately warn of this
side-effect.156
The circumstances in this case gave rise to a consideration of whether
name-brand manufacturers can be liable for harm caused by the combined use of
labeling language it created and a product it did not manufacture.157 The
difficulty with this case, and other cases of this nature, is that the harm was
caused by a misrepresentation regarding a generic medication, but that that
misrepresentation was first authored by the name-brand manufacturer for its own
medication.158 The only reason the misrepresentation was on the generic label
was because federal law required that the generic label contain the exact same
information as the name-brand product label.159 Plaintiff claimed that the namebrand manufacturer had breached its reasonable duty of care because it failed to
warn Mr. Weeks or his physician of the potential dangers associated with the
generic version of the name-brand medication.160 This argument is a version of
manufacturer liability, which is rooted in the idea that there is enough of a nexus
between the name-brand manufacturer and the generic manufacturer to open the
name-brand manufacturer up to liability.161 The defendant companies claimed
that this dispute should be judged under a product liability standard and under
said standard plaintiffs could not present a prima facie case.162 The defendant’s
primary arguments were that the plaintiffs (i) failed to affirmatively identify the
name-brand product as the product that caused the harm and (ii) the name-brand

153. Id.
154. Id. at 653–55.
155. Id. at 656.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 653–54.
158. Id.
159. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984).
160. Weeks, 159 So.3d at 656.
161. Victor E. Schwartz et al., Warning: Shifting Liability to Manufacturers of Brand-Name Medicines
When the Harm Was Allegedly Caused by Generic Drugs has Severe Side Effect, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
1835 (2013). Some critics of name-brand manufacturer liability cunningly have deemed this form of
liability “innovator liability” to create a bias against holding those who first create medications liable.
Victor E. Schwartz et al., Deep Pocket Jurisprudence: Where Tort Law Should Draw the Line, 70 OKLA.
L. REV. 359, 360–61 (2018).
162. Weeks, 159 So.3d at 656.
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manufacturers had no duty to warn consumers about the risks associated with
ingestion of the generic version of their medication.163
The court applied existing Alabama law to determine whether the namebrand manufacturer could be held liable for false representations on the warning
labels that it created, which were subsequently copied by generic companies.164
The court asserted that state case law established “a duty to disclose may be owed
to a person with whom the defendant has had no prior dealings, specifically,
where there is a duty not to make a false representation to those members of a
group or class that the defendant has special reason to expect to be influenced by
the representation.”165
The Supreme Court of Alabama ruled against the name-brand
manufacturer, finding that because of FDA regulations and the close relationship
between name-brand and generic medications, it was foreseeable that generic
medication consumers would have to rely on warnings drafted by name-brand
manufacturers.166 Due to the federal regulations on prescription-drugs, Wyeth
had “special reason to expect” that the information presented on its
metoclopramide labeling was “intended to reach and influence” users of both the
name-brand and generic versions of the medication.167
This ruling also furthered the common public policy goal of reducing
tortious conduct by creating a duty for name-brand manufacturers to ensure
proper warnings are provided to consumers of both name-brand and generic
medications.168 This decision added an incentive for name-brand manufacturers
operating in Alabama to adequately warn drug prescribers of the risks associated
with the name-brand and generic medications, so that prescribers could
accurately relay those risks to end-consumers.169 Under this precedent, if namebrand manufacturers provide adequate warning to the prescribers of medication,
then the manufacturer has likely satisfied its duty to the end users.170 Conversely,
if there is a failure to warn and the deficiencies, misrepresentations, or inadequate
warnings were created by the name-brand manufacturer, that manufacturer can
be held liable for the harm caused thereby.171
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C. 2017-2018: Divided Times
Providing an adequate remedy for consumers that are harmed by generic
drugs remains a hot-topic in the tort law world. In the short time spanning
between December 21, 2017 and May 11, 2018 there were three state court
decisions addressing this conundrum.172 Fortunately for consumers, two of the
three courts, the Supreme Court of California and the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, recognized name-brand manufacturer liability.173 Accepting the
defendant’s policy argument, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
did not adopt name-brand manufacturer liability,174 and seemingly gave little
regard to the central tort principle that the party responsible for causing harm
should be liable for the suffering they created.175
T.H. v. Novartis arose from birth defects caused by a mother’s use of
mislabeled medication and sustained by children in utero.176 In arriving at its
decision to hold name-brand manufacturer’s liable when the inadequate labeling
they created injured a consumer of the generic product, the T.H. court identified
a number of key facts that guided its reasoning.177 The court noted:
Federal law explicitly conveys to the brand-name manufacturer–and only
that manufacturer–the responsibility to provide an adequate warning label for
both the [generic medication] and its brand-name equivalent… Only the brandname manufacturer has unilateral authority to modify the drug’s label… Generic
drug manufacturers are required to follow the brand-name manufacturer’s label
to the letter. Accordingly the [name-brand manufacturer] controlled both the
form and content of the [] warning label.178
Recognizing that within the pharmaceutical marketplace name-brand
manufacturer’s control the medication labeling, the court found the plaintiff’s
reliance on the RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS § 311,179 persuasive.

172. See T.H. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 407 P.3d 18 (Cal. 2017); Rafferty v. Merck & Co., 92 N.E.3d
1205 (Mass. 2018); McNair v. Johnson & Johnson, 818 S.E.2d 862 (W.Va. 2018).
173. T.H., 407 P.3d at 47–48; Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1219–20.
174. McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 856, 861.
175. George Mason Law and Economics Center, Congressional Civil Justice Academy Debate:
Inventing New Liability? Who Should We Blame When Generic Drugs Harm Patients?, VIMEO (Feb. 9,
2018), https://vimeo.com/255119753. Leslie A. Brueckner, a senior attorney at Public Justice and lead
counsel in the T.H. case, noted that the argument in favor of innovator liability is founded upon the
fundamental principle that those responsible for injuring others should be held responsible.
176. T.H., 407 P.3d at 22.
177. Id. at 28–29.
178. Id. at 22.
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §311 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) provides that “[o]ne who
negligently gives false information to another is subject to liability for physical harm caused by action
taken by the other in reasonable reliable upon such information, where such harm results to the other or
to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril by the action taken.” Comment b to §311
explains that this section “finds particular application where it is a part of the actor’s business or profession
to give information upon which the safety of the recipient or a third persons depends.” See also Prosser,
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Importantly, the Court’s analysis provides significant insight regarding the
impact of foreseeability in inadequately labeled medication cases.180 In
California, as in many other jurisdictions, foreseeability of physical harm is the
most important factor in determining the appropriate duty of care.181 The court
found that, since only name-brand manufacturers have a federally imposed duty
to update the warning labels, name-brand manufacturers know to a legal certainty
that “any deficiencies in the label for its drug will be perpetuated in the label for
its generic bioequivalent.”182 The court determined that this knowledge, paired
with often required substitution practices,183 made it entirely foreseeable that the
warnings included or not included on the name-brand drug label would influence
the administration of the generic drug.184 A combined application of the court’s
interpretation of the federal regulations, California precedent and longrecognized tort principles led the Supreme Court of California to find that
“brand-name drug manufacturers have a duty to use ordinary care in warning
about the safety risks of their drugs, regardless of whether the injured party (in
reliance on the brand-name manufacturer’s warning) was dispensed the brand
name or generic version of the drug.”185
Endorsement of name-brand manufacturer liability on the East Coast was
provided by the Rafferty court, which found consumers “may bring a commonlaw recklessness claim against [a] brand-name manufacturer if it failed to update
the label on its drug, knowing or having reason to know of an unreasonable risk
of death or grave bodily injury associated with its use.”186 This case arose from
injurious side effects related to a generic medication that was used to treat
enlarged prostates.187 While the court reiterated that “brand-name manufacturers
are in the best position…to prevent an injury arising from the inaccurate or
inadequate warning on a generic drug,”188 it provided a slightly limited
application of name-brand liability, allowing claims to proceed for recklessness,
rather than garden-variety negligence.189 The court’s reasoning for this decision
Misrepresentation and Third Persons (1966) 19. VAND. L.REV. 231, 254 (explaining that individuals have
a duty to refrain from making false statements to “[t]hose to whom a public duty is found to have been
created by statute, or pursuant to a statute. . . [and to] [t]hose members of a group or class whom he has
special reason to expect to be influenced by the misrepresentation.”).
180. T.H., 407 P.3d at 29.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Substitution regulations generally are either legal statutory requirements or insurance company
procedures that result in the generic drug being provided by the pharmacist in lieu of the name-brand drug.
T.H., 407 P.3d at 29–30.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 47.
186. Rafferty v. Merck & Co., 92 N.E.3d 1205, 1209 (Mass. 2018).
187. Id. at 1211–12.
188. Id. at 1217.
189. Id. at 1217–18.
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largely centered upon policy implications and societal risk-benefit analysis.190
The court held that “public policy is not served if generic drug consumers have
no remedy for the failure of a brand-name manufacturer to warn in cases where
such failure exceeds ordinary negligence, and rises to the level of
recklessness.”191 Now, under Massachusetts law, consumers can hold namebrand manufacturers liable when they intentionally fail to “update the label on
its drug to warn of an unreasonable risk of death or grave bodily injury, where
the manufacturer knows of this risk or knows of facts that would disclose this
risk to any reasonable person.”192 The approach employed in Rafferty is
agreeable with the balance struck in the Hatch-Waxman amendments, provides
only a slight threat of increased litigation to pharmaceutical companies and could
be a happy medium for jurisdictions that are not yet comfortable adopting a
negligence-based theory for recovery against name-brand manufacturers for
inadequate medication warning labels.
Contrary to the two decisions detailed immediately above, the McNair
holding rejected name-brand manufacturer liability and held fast to a restrictive
mislabeled generic medication analysis.193McNair arose from the plaintiff’s
development of acute respiratory distress after taking a generic medication. This
controversy came before the court on order of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit certifying the following question:
Whether West Virginia law permits a claim of failure to warn and negligent
misrepresentation against a branded drug manufacturer when the drug ingested
was produced by a generic manufacturer.194
The court answered this question in the negative.195 The McNair decision,
without including significant discussion of foreseeability or the responsibility of
the name-brand manufacturer to update warning labels, hinged on the basic idea
that liability is usually premised on the defendant being the manufacturer or
seller of the product in question.196 Inexplicably, in reaching this conclusion, the
McNair court cited to Maryland law without regard to recent developments in
Maryland precedent.197 The McNair court did not heed the holding in May v. Air
& Liquid Systems Corporation, as explained below, which allowed a
manufacturer to be held liable for harm arising from the combined used of the
manufacturer’s inadequate warning and another product.198 Furthermore, the
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Id. at 1215 –18.
Id. at 1215–19.
Id. at 1220.
McNair v. Johnson & Johnson, 818 S.E.2d 852, 861 (W.Va. 2018).
Id. at 856.
Id.
Id. at 859–60.
Id. at 864–65.
See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
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West Virginia decision reviewed how the medication label and underlying
product are inherently different items, but dismissed the ability to separate the
two in regard to where liability should fall.199 Where the legal foundation
appeared unsound, the court relied on popular judicial sentiment to bolster its
position, citing multiple times to the fact that the majority of states had not yet
adopted name-brand manufacturer liability.200 The McNair court ultimately held
that there is not a cause of action in West Virginia for failure to warn and
negligent misrepresentation against name-brand manufacturers when the
ingested drug was a generic.201
D. The Home Front
Facing down a what appears to be an evolving, yet stubborn swath of
precedent leaving injured generic consumers without redress, I now turn to May
v. Liquid Air Systems, a decision that identified scenarios where manufacturers
can be held liable for harm caused by the combined use of their inadequate
warning and another product.202 In May, the Maryland Court of Appeal’s
application of widely-accepted tort rules pertaining to duty and causation allow
plaintiffs to hold manufacturers to a necessary and reasonable standard.203 The
crux of this holding is grounded in the traditional tort concept that liability should
fall on the party that is responsible for the harm, best positioned to make the
plaintiff whole and most able to prevent future injury.204 Similar to the consumerfriendly decision in Weeks, the court in this case also recognized the importance
of foreseeability in determining when a duty is owed by a manufacturer to an
injured plaintiff.205
The May v. Liquid Air Systems court emphasized that in strict liability and
negligence actions involving personal injury, the principal determinant of duty
is foreseeability.206 Although this decision involved harms created by asbestoscontaining products,207 the court’s legal analysis framework can be applied to
other tort claims, such as pharmaceutical negligent failure to warn and strict
liability design defect actions. A brief review of the May decision provides
context for the application of its framework in other situations.

199. McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 861.
200. Id. at 863–65.
201. Id. at 867.
202. 129 A.3d 984 (Md. 2015).
203. Id.
204. SHULMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 573–609.
205. Compare Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So.3d 649 (Ala. 2014) with May v. Air & Liquid Systems,
129 A.3d 984 (Md. 2015).
206. May, 129 A.3d at 994 (citing Doe v. Pharmacia & Upjohn Co., Inc., 388 Md. 407, 416 (2005)
and Jacques v. First Nat’l Bank of Md., 307 Md. 527, 534–35 (Md. 1986)).
207. May, 129 A.3d at 986–87.
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In May, replacement asbestos-containing gaskets were necessary for the
proper functioning of the manufacturer’s product.208 Repairmen needed to
replace those gaskets multiple times, and each time they did so they were
exposed to asbestos.209 One of the repairmen who subsequently suffered from
asbestos-related disease brought suit against the original system manufacturers
for their failure to warn of the dangers associated with replacement gaskets, even
though the original manufacturers did not make the replacement parts that
directly exposed Mr. May to asbestos.210
The court reasoned that the foreseeability of harm to workers servicing
pumps with asbestos gaskets and packing was especially strong where a
manufacturer knew or should have known that those components were necessary
to the proper functioning of its product and must be replaced periodically.211 The
court proceeded by evaluating seven factors to determine whether their collective
weight favored imposing a duty.212 Those factors were:
1. Foreseeability;
2. Degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered harm;
3. The closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the
injury suffered;
4. The extent of the burden to the defendant and the consequences to the
community of imposing a duty to exercise care;
5. Moral blame;
6. The policy of preventing future harm;
7. The availability, cost and prevalence of insurance.
As Maryland law reflects that the foreseeability of harm factor is a
significant determinant of whether or not a duty exists, and it favored imposing
a duty in this case, there was a compelling argument in favor of finding that a

208. Id. at 994–95.
209. Id. at 986–90.
210. Id. at 986–87.
211. Id. at 994.
212. Id. at 989–94; see also Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 567 (Cal. 1968) (providing a clear
application of the factors that can be used to determine when a duty is owed by a tortfeasor and plaintiff);
Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 919 (Cal. 1968) (demonstrating that foreseeability is the primary factor in
determining whether a duty existed); Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342, 344
(Cal. 1976) (demonstrating an application of the Rowland analysis, and establishing that a special
relationship between two parties that are sufficiently involved can create a duty for one party “to assume
some responsibility” to the other party in the relationship or third parties that may be harmed). In
California, this factor-based analysis is applied when the defendant is acting affirmatively, while in
Maryland the factor-based approach has been applied in many different contexts and has not been
circumscribed to limited situations, as illustrated in Patton v. U.S. Rugby Football, 851 A.2d 566, 571
(Md. 2004) (citing Ashburn v. Anne Arundel Cty., 510 A.2d 1078, 1083 (Md. 1986)).
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duty existed.213 When the court balanced the subsidiary factors along with the
predominant foreseeability factor, finding a duty was the appropriate choice.214
Thus, the court decided that manufacturers sometimes have a duty to provide
adequate warnings for products that the manufacturer did not produce and failure
to do so may result in liability.215
Having identified that manufacturers can have a duty to warn about
defective products that they did not place into the stream of commerce, the May
court next addressed what is required to prove factual causation and impose
liability in these scenarios. Utilizing the language provided by the Supreme Court
of California in O’Neil v. Crane Co,216 the Maryland Court of Appeals reasoned
that a product manufacturer may be held liable in strict liability or negligence for
harm caused by another manufacturer’s product when the defendant’s own
product contributed substantially to the harm, or the defendant participated
substantially in creating a harmful combined use of the products.217
In May, it was undisputed that the defendant had sold asbestos laden
component parts to the Navy and that those parts would be used by the Navy in
mechanical pumps.218 The employment record demonstrated that the plaintiff, as
a mechanic who worked for the Navy, performed maintenance on the mechanical
pumps, was required to handle replacements for the original manufacturer’s
defective component parts and relied on the associated instruction manuals for
the products that the component parts were incorporated in.219 Significantly, the
defendant manufacturer did not refute the allegation that it knew the asbestos
pumps were dangerous and that they would need to be replaced periodically,
rather the defendants claimed that the needs of the war effort should excuse their
conduct.220 Mr. May made clear that he would have relied on warnings related to
asbestos had they been in the instruction manual, as he always conducted
maintenance in accordance with the instruction manual.221 Therefore had the
instruction manuals contained adequate warnings, Mr. May would have been
able to minimize exposure to asbestos and prevent the injury he suffered.222 The
court held that there was sufficient factual support to demonstrate causation as it
pertained to a negligent failure to warn claim.223 Additionally, “[b]ecause of the
intersections between strict liability and negligent failure to warn claims,” the
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

May, 129 A.3d at 994.
Id. at 1000.
Id.
266 P.3d 987 (Cal. 2012).
May, 129 A.3d at 995 (citing O’neil v. Crane Co., 266 P.3d 987, 991 (Cal. 2012).
Id. at 986.
Id. at 986–87.
Id. at 993.
Id. at 986–87.
Id.
Id. at 996.
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May court also concluded “that a manufacturer has a duty to warn of asbestoscontaining replacement components that it has not placed into the stream of
commerce in strict liability in the same narrow circumstances as in
negligence.”224 The manufacturer had a duty to warn the plaintiff about the
dangers associated with the asbestos gasket replacement process and the
manufacturer breached that duty when they failed to supply adequate warnings.
This case illustrates a manner by which manufacturers can cause harm by
supplying an inadequate warning and be held accountable for the harm arising
from that failure to warn.
Utilizing the duty and causation analysis applied by the Maryland Court of
Appeals could provide injured consumers of generic drugs a way to hold namebrand manufacturers liable. While some may critique this form of liability
because it holds parties liable that have recently been able to escape
responsibility, it is merely a function of widely accepted tort principles.225 By
using well-settled law in a nuanced combination,226 this theory allows courts to
place liability on tortfeasors that bear responsibility for creating an inadequate
warning regarding another manufacturer’s product, even when the tortfeasor was
not privy to the final product purchase transaction. Before demonstrating that
analysis, we will briefly review two contexts that already allow duty and
causation to be established in a similar manner.
E. Liability Without Privity: Architects
In addition to the May holding, there have been other courts that found
parties liable even though they were not privy to the transaction giving rise to
harm. Construction professionals are one such group that has been found liable
in the absence of privity. Ossining Union Free School Dist. v. Anderson,227 is a
case that demonstrates how courts hold parties liable for harm they have caused
through misrepresentation.228 While not all aspects of this case are directly
applicable to mislabeled generic medication lawsuits, components of the legal
analysis are directly transferrable.
In Ossining, a consulting engineer who was hired by a head project architect
was sued by the project owner for negligent misrepresentation.229 The court
posed the question whether “in negligent misrepresentation cases . . . is privity
of contract required in order for plaintiff to state a cause of action?”230 The court
responded that bringing a valid action required the underlying relationship
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 998.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 18, 282, 283, 388, 402A, 402B (AM. LAW. INST. 1965).
See infra Part IV.
539 N.E.2d 91 (N.Y. 1989).
Id.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 91.

124

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 22:99

between the parties to be one of “contract or the bond between them so close as
to be the functional equivalent of contractual privity.”231 The court defined
privity of contract “as a means of fixing fair manageable bounds of liability.” 232
The court adhered to the long-standing rule for recovery of pecuniary loss for
negligent misrepresentation that requires privity or “a relationship so close as to
approach that of privity.”233
In finding that the project owner’s intended reliance created the sufficient
“bond,” even though there was no semblance of a contract or traditional privity,
the court determined that liability may arise when there is awareness that
information is to be used for a particular purpose, there is reliance by a party in
furtherance of that purpose and there is some conduct by the defendants linking
them to the reliant party and evincing defendant’s understanding of the reliant
party’s reliance.”234 The court held that the facts alleged by the owner against the
consultants satisfied these criteria.235 Through direct contact with plaintiffs,
information transmitted by the contracting architect and the notice of work, the
consultants “could not have possibly failed to know that the plaintiff would
receive and use the engineering report.”236
The two important takeaways from this precedent are that (i) a party’s
intended reliance on the representations of a tortfeasor can create grounds for
establishing a duty in tort cases and (ii) that it is permissible to hold a tortfeasor
liable for causing harm to a plaintiff through the tortfeasor’s acts or omissions,
even when the harm stems strictly from inaccurate representations or warnings
provided by the tortfeasor.237 Although there is more than mere pecuniary loss
involved in our mislabeled generic medication cases, the principle that reliance
by party “Y” on party “Z” can create a bond or nexus which allows for a
defendant party to be found liable may be applicable in the inadequate
medication label context.238 One can identify how the principles applied in
Ossining could also be used in generic medication failure to warn actions when
plaintiffs are attempting to hold a name-brand manufacturer liable. The modified
application could take the following form:
Under this theory, name-brand manufactures may be liable for a generic
consumers’ harm when the (i) the name-brand manufacturers have an awareness
that their advertisements and warnings reach prescribers and consumers when
decisions are made about using a generic medication; (ii) there is reliance by

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 95; Credit Alliance Corp. v. Andersen & Co., 493 N.Y.S.2d 435, 443 (N.Y. 1985).
Ossining Union Free School Dist., 539 N.E.2d at 95.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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prescribers and consumers on the name-brand warnings and information
campaigns; and (iii) the name-brand manufacturer’s assertions and conduct
evidence the name-brand manufacturer’s understanding that the prescribers and
consumers of generic drugs would rely on their representations.
A presiding judge could find that the facts alleged by generic consumers
against name-brand manufacturers satisfy these criteria. Based on direct contact
with generic consumer plaintiffs via advertisements, removed contact through
warning information transmitted by information campaigns, and compliance
with the federal medication labeling regulations, it is foreseeable to name brandmanufacturers that generic consumers receive and rely on name-brand
manufacturer medication warnings. This foreseeability should give rise to a duty
that would be breached if the name-brand manufacturer failed to provide an
adequate warning, which subsequently causes harm to the end consumer that
relied on the inadequate warning.
F. Leaving the Door Open
There have been additional carveouts introduced by courts across the
country that allow manufacturers to be held liable for products they did not
create. California is one such jurisdiction that, even before its 2018 adoption of
name-brand manufacturer liability, provided an avenue for holding
manufacturers liable for harm caused by the combined use of their inadequate
warning labels with another manufacturer’s product.239 O’Neal v. Crane Co.
demonstrates how California courts left the door open for harmed consumers to
redress their injuries.240 This wrongful death case arose from a death that was
allegedly caused by asbestos released from third party products that were added
to the defendant’s product post-sale.241 It differs from the May decision in that
the original product produced by the defendant did not contain asbestos.242
The California Supreme Court explicitly held that “a product manufacturer
may not be held liable in strict liability or negligence for harm caused by another
manufacturer’s product unless the defendant’s own product contributed
substantially to the harm.”243 The court determined that when a defendant
participated substantially in creating a harmful combined use of the products, as
the manufactures did in May, the original manufacturer, can be held liable.244
The O’Neil court thus recognized that a manufacturer is generally not liable for
component parts it did not touch, but can be liable in certain circumstances.245
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

O’Neil v. Crane Co., 266 P.3d 987 (Cal. 2012).
Id.
Id. at 991.
Compare May v. Air & Liquid Systems, 129 A.3d 984 (Md. 2015) with O’Neil, 266 P.3d 987.
O’Neil, 266 P.3d at 991.
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The provision that allows for liability when the original manufacturer
participated substantially in the harmful combined use of the products could be
applicable in the generic medication mislabeling context.
IV. TACKLING THE TWO KEY ISSUES
Having reviewed the guiding precedent, this paper now connects legal
theories that may allow injured consumers of mislabeled generic drugs to be
made whole. Addressing this problem involves overcoming the two primary
issues that permeate the case law above: (i) establishing there was both a duty
owed and causation and (ii) escaping the effects of federal preemption. This
paper addresses each in turn.
A. Establishing the Elements of Duty and Causation
Of the two primary legal obstacles, this section first addresses the
imposition of a duty and how to prove causation. Fortunately for injured
consumers, case law demonstrates that proving breach and damages in
inadequate warning label claims usually is achieved without significant
challenges.246 Therefore this section does not provide further review of those
elements, rather it delivers extensive analysis of the two problematic elements–
duty and causation. From the reasoning in May, Weeks, Ossining, Novartis and
Rafferty one can derive ample support for establishing duty and causation as they
pertain to harm suffered by generic medication consumers that stems from
inadequate warnings from name-brand manufacturers.
i. Imposing a Duty
A logical starting point for a plaintiff that was injured because of reliance
on an inadequate medication warning label would be to apply the factor-based
analysis set forth in May to establish that they were owed a duty by the namebrand manufacturer.
1. Foreseeability
The foreseeability of harm to a consumer of generic medication who must
rely on inadequate medication warning information created by a name-brand
manufacturer weighs heavily in favor of imposing a duty on name-brand
manufacturers to provide adequate warnings to consumers of generic medication.
As a result of federal regulations that require generic labels to match name-brand
labels, there can be no doubt that name-brand manufacturers have notice that
their actions will reach and influence consumers of the generic version of their

246. See discussion supra Section III.C, III.D.
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medication.247 These facts support a contention that the foreseeability of harm
factor weighs in favor of imposing a duty on the name-brand manufacturer.
2. Degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered harm
The “degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered the injury “ also weighs
in favor of imposing a duty on name-brand manufacturers in inadequate
medication labeling cases. Name-brand drug manufacturers cannot effectively
contest that injured consumers of mislabeled generic medication suffered as a
result of their failure to warn. Only name-brand manufacturers can change what
is on the labels that warn consumers of both generic and name-brand versions of
a medication.248 When a serious side-effect is not warned about and a consumer
is injured, the potential plaintiff has, by definition, suffered harm. In these cases,
the harm suffered is usually not minor.249 The injuries can range from severe
movement disorders to the destruction of large portions of consumers’ skin.250
This factor favors imposing a duty.
3. The closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct
and the injury suffered
This factor also weighs in favor of holding the name-brand manufacturer
liable. The name-brand manufacturer did all the drug testing, explained the
dangers of the medication to the prescriber, and printed the warning labels that
the generic manufacturers had to copy (which the generic consumer was forced
to rely on).251 But for the failure to warn by the name-brand manufacturers,
consumers of mislabeled generic drugs would not have been harmed.
Furthermore, a duty to warn may arise if the manufacturer knows that its product
will be interchanged with the generic medication and that the two will be
represented as being essentially the same product.252 Given that federal
medication labeling laws and many state “substitution” laws provide notice that
name-brand products and generic products can be interchanged, name-brand
manufacturers either are aware or should be aware that their goods and generics
will be represented as essentially the same product.253

247. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984).
248. Id.; T.H. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 407 P.3d 18, 22 (Cal. 2017).
249. See discussion supra Sections III.A, III.B.
250. See discussion supra Sections III.A, III.B.
251. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984); T.H., 407 P.3d 22–23.
252. See generally Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So.3d 649 (2014).
253. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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4. The extent of the burden to the defendant and the consequences to
the community of imposing a duty to exercise care
This factor can go either way based on how a court analyzes it. The burden
on the manufacturer of adding a few words to the label it prints is negligible,
especially in comparison to the harm that consumers may suffer in the event that
the label is not updated, and the consumers are unaware of potential risks. If that
is the only burden considered, this factor would favor imposing a duty and
possibly liability. If the burden includes a significant amount of costly additional
testing that would need to be completed to identify new issues, this factor could
result in a finding that favors manufacturers instead of consumers. Where there
is large amount of expensive testing required to improve the label and the
potential harm is slight, then this factor may favor not imposing a burden and
liability.
5. Moral blame
This factor likely goes against imposing a duty and liability. Since the
name-brand manufacturer likely did not knowingly keep information off the
label, it is difficult to assign moral blame to their actions.254 This factor could
become radically more influential in the event that either the generic or namebrand manufacturer actively ensured that negative information about its
medication was hidden from the public domain.255 If that was the case, and as a
result harm befell consumers, there would be a more effective argument for
assigning moral blame.
6. The policy of preventing future harm
This factor is in favor of imposing a duty and liability. If there is a
medication that has harmful side effects that are not accounted for on the label,
then adding the additional warnings will help reduce future harm. Since only the
name-brand manufacturer can rightfully change the label,256 they should be the
ones held liable when the label does appropriately reflect the potential harms of
a medication. Generic manufacturers are not allowed to independently change
the medication warning labels,257 so they should not be held liable for injuries
related to inadequate labeling. In fact, the only ability that generic companies
have to affect change is to bring concerns to the FDA and name-brand company

254. If the manufacturer knowingly kept information off the label, the plaintiffs would not need to
pursue a negligence claim, rather they could levy charges for recklessness (as provided for in Rafferty) or
fraud. Rafferty v. Merck & Co., 92 N.E.3d 1205, 1209 (Mass. 2018).
255. Id.
256. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984).
257. Id.; see also PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604 (2011); Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v.
Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472 (2013).

2019]

SERIOUS SIDE EFFECTS MAY OCCUR

129

in hopes that the name-brand company may act.258 It is the name-brand company
that has the authority, ability, and legal duty to change the labels so that they
provide sufficient warnings to potential consumers.259 Providing an incentive for
name-brand manufacturer’s to better inform consumers furthers the policy goal
of preventing future harm.
7. The availability, cost and prevalence of insurance
This is a neutral factor as the name brand and generic manufacturers likely
both have insurance, so there likely would be no further analysis of which
company would be better shielded from potential loses. The one clear point is
that the consumers should not be forced to deal with these injuries alone as they
are likely in the worst position to address the financial challenges created by
treating their harm. Loss distribution principles play a meaningful, but not
dispositive, role in this portion of the analysis and they support imposing a duty.
8. Balancing the Factors
As noted by the Maryland Court of Appeals in May, in negligence and strict
liability actions involving personal injury, the principal determinant of duty is
foreseeability.260 The foreseeability of harm to consumers that rely on inaccurate
warning information for generic medications is especially strong when namebrand manufacturers know or should know that the consumers of the generic
versions will rely on the name-brand manufacturer’s representations for the
equivalent generic product.261 Given that there is a high degree of foreseeability,
this predominant factor supports holding name-brand manufacturer’s liable for
harm created by their inadequate warning labels. Evaluating the subsidiary
factors, it appears that three or four of the remaining six also favor imposing a
duty. This analysis results in a majority of the factors, including the most
influential one, supporting imposing a duty and an obligation to bear liability.
Under May, it appears clear that a duty exists for name-brand manufacturers to
provide accurate warnings for consumers of both name-brand and generic
versions of the medication.

258. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984).
259. Id.
260. See supra note 206.
261. See May v. Air & Liquid Systems, 129 A.3d 984 (Md. 2015); Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So.3d
649 (2014); George Mason Law & Economics Center, Congressional Civil Justice Academy Debate:
Inventing New Liability? Who Should We Blame When Generic Drugs Harm Patients?, VIMEO (Feb. 9,
2018), https://vimeo.com/255119753 (illustrating that even Phil Goldberg, an esteemed critic of namebrand manufacturer liability, admits that consumers will often rely on representations made by the namebrand manufacturer).
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ii. Showing Factual Causation
Having established that name-brand manufacturers owe a duty to the
consumers of generic drugs, the next issue to address is factual causation.
Generally speaking, the most feverishly debated issue regarding name-brand
manufacturer liability is whether causation can be established when the drug
consumed was a generic.262 Critics claim that it cannot be, as the medication
ingested closest to the time that harm is recognized is a generic, not a name-brand
product.263 This theory, although accepted by a number of courts, fails to address
the fact that the inadequate warning is a cause of the harm, not merely the
medication itself.264 All medications have side-effects, and based on the severity
of those side-effects compared to the ailment that a medication is being used to
treat, a consumer must decide whether to use the medication in question.265 When
an inadequate medication warning is created by the name-brand manufacturer,
generic consumers are forced to rely on that same warning in deciding to use the
associated generic medication. If that consumer then suffers from a side-effect
that was not properly warned of, the flawed warning played a role in inducing
use and causing the consumer’s harm. When name-brand manufacturer’s breach
the duty they owe to generic consumers by providing inadequate medication
warning labels, that failure can cause injury. As reiterated in May, a defendant
manufacturer can cause harm to a consumer through that consumer’s use of
another manufacturer’s product when the defendant manufacturer’s own product
contributed substantially to the harm, or the defendant manufacturer participated
substantially in creating a harmful combined use of the products.266
In the inadequately labeled generic medication context, name-brand
manufacturers contribute substantially to both the direct harm suffered by
generic consumers and to the combined use of lacking name-brand label
warnings with generic medication.267 The inadequate warning instructions
authored by the name-brand manufacturers cause harm to generic consumers, as
those warnings are printed on generic medications and do not provide sufficient
insight regarding the potential risks associated with either the name-brand or

262. George Mason Law & Economics Center, supra note 261; Wolfman & King, supra note 1, at 9–
10; see also Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472 (2013); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564
U.S. 604 (2011).
263. Weeks, 159 So.3d at 684–708 (Murdock, J. dissenting) (citing cases throughout the twelve circuits
where courts have refused to find name-brand manufacturer liability when the plaintiff ingested the
generic drug).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. May v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 129 A.3d 984, 995 (Md. 2015).
267. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472; PLIVA, 564 U.S. 604; Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353 (Iowa 2014);
Weeks, 159 So.3d 649.
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generic medication.268 The provision of insufficient warnings can directly cause
the consumer’s harm by inducing the generic consumer to use a medication and
experience unexpected side-effects, satisfying the first means by which liability
can be assessed against a name-brand manufacturer.269 The second liability
theory, which is grounded in combined use, can be satisfied through the namebrand manufacturer’s publishing of advertisements and commercials directly to
the public. Through the use of direct marketing to consumers via various media
sources and information campaigns, the name-brand manufacturers are
participating substantially in the combined use of the generic medications (which
will be associated with name-brand products) and the warnings provided through
media regarding the name-brand products.
The aforementioned direct harm and combined use liability theories, first
set forth by the California Supreme Court and subsequently adopted in Maryland,
can readily be applied to instances that involve injuries caused by inadequate
name-brand warning labels.270 But for the name-brand manufacturer’s
proliferation of flawed medication warning labels and instructions, the generic
medications would not have contained inaccurate information. Therefore, absent
the name-brand manufacturer’s provision of inadequate warnings, the consumers
of generic medications would not have been induced by those same inadequate
warnings to use a medication that had severe side-affects. When generic
medication consumers are injured by inadequate labels provided by name-brand
manufacturers, there should be sufficient facts to show factual causation.
Fundamental tenets of tort law support imposing liability on name-brand
manufacturers that cause harm to generic medication consumers by providing
inadequate side-effect warnings.271
iii. Weaving Together the Duty and Causation Analysis
Principles set forth in Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, Ossining Union Free School
Dist. v. Anderson, T.H. v. Novartis, Rafferty v. Merck and O’Neal v. Crane Co.
bolster an argument in favor of name-brand manufacturer liability. The Ossining
duty and causation analysis appears to be transferrable to the generic drug
consumer context.272 The federally mandated reliance by generic producers on
the representations of name-brand producers aids in the creation of a close nexus
between name-brand manufacturers and generic manufacturers.273 Since the

268. T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., 407 P.3d 18 (Cal. 2017); Wolfman & King, supra note
1, at 17.
269. T.H., 407 P.3d at 47.
270. T.H., 407 P.3d 18; May, 129 A.3d 984.
271. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 18, 282, 283, 388, 402A, 402B (AM. LAW. INST. 1965).
272. Ossining Union Free School Dist. v. Anderson, 539 N.E.2d 91 (N.Y. 1989).
273. Id.; Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–417, 98
Stat. 1585 (1984).
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name-brand manufacturers are provided clear notice that their representations
will be recreated on generic medication warning labels, it is foreseeable that
consumers of the generic medications will rely on the name-brand
manufacturer’s representations. The substantial degree of reliance by consumers
of generic medications suggests a nexus between those consumers and the namebrand manufacturer on whom they rely, establishing a duty owed by the namebrand manufacturers to the generic consumers.274 When a name-brand
manufacturer provides a defective label, which is subsequently replicated by
generic manufacturers, harm to generic consumers caused by their reliance on
the defective warnings can satisfy the causation element for a claim against the
name-brand manufacturer. Even though the name-brand manufacturer does not
directly supply the medication, it does create the injury-causing inadequate
warning.
Similarly, under the Weeks and T.H. precedent, the significant level of
foreseeability creates a “special reason” for the name brand manufacturer to
expect that its representations will “reach and effect” not only consumers of the
name-brand medication, but the generic version as well.275 The “special reasons”
name-brand manufacturers have to know that their representations will influence
generic medication consumers is grounded in the inherent combined use of the
medication warnings provided for the name-brand and generic versions of the
medicine.276 As noted in O’Neal v. Crane, Co., when a manufacturer participates
substantially in creating harmful combined usage, that manufacturer can be held
liable for harm to the end consumer.277 In the pharmaceutical market context, the
warning labels for name-brand medications are inherently used in combination
with the warnings provided on generic labels.278 In fact, the generic and namebrand labels are the exact same.279
Medications are not reasonably safe due to inadequate instructions or
warnings if reasonable warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm are not
provided with the medication.280 This rule emphasizes how important it is that
the consumers of both name-brand and generic medication be adequately
informed of the risks associated with that product.281 When name-brand
manufacturers do not provide adequate warnings about a medication, this can
cause injury to consumers that are harmed by their uninformed use of name-

274. Id.
275. Weeks, 159 So.3d at 676; T.H., 407 P.3d at 27.
276. Weeks, 159 So.3d at 676–77.
277. 266 P.3d 987, 991 (Cal. 2012).
278. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984).
279. Id.
280. OWEN & DAVIS, supra at note 53, at 326–31.
281. Id. at 326.
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brand and generic medications.282 Therefore, because name-brand manufacturers
can cause harm to generic consumers through inadequate warnings and this harm
is foreseeable, the duty and causation requirements for claims against namebrand manufacturers can be satisfied for failure to warn claims stemming from
injurious inadequate warnings.
B. Escaping Preemption
After proving duty and causation, the next step in levying a strong claim
against name-brand manufacturers for harms arising from a mislabeled generic
drug would require the plaintiff to demonstrate why federal preemption does not
bar their suit.283 Fortunately, the road to recovery for injured consumers
attempting to hold name-brand manufacturers liable is much less treacherous
than the footpaths plaintiffs must follow when trying to hold generic
manufacturers responsible. Wyeth v. Levine controls this issue, as the United
States Supreme Court held in that case that state law tort duties do not obstruct
FDA drug regulations.284 Specifically, the court ruled that claims against namebrand manufacturers are not preempted by federal law as there is zero indication
that Congress intended to bar such tort claims in regard to inadequate medication
warning instructions.285 The reasoning underlying the perpetuation of state tort
claims is detailed below. The discussion that follows takes on enhanced
significance because of the current posture of the Supreme Court. As our highest
court’s bench has recently welcomed two conservative Justices,286 there is a
possibility that Levine could be overturned.287 In the event Levine is nullified, a
plaintiff would need to fall back on traditional tort principles to overcome the
defendant name-brand manufacturer’s preemption defense.
Under the governing statutory law, the FDCA and Hatch-Waxman
Amendments do not use language to expressly preempt state law, nor is there
any conflict preemption or material indication that Congress intended to preempt

282. Id.
283. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472 (2013); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S.
604 (2011); Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353 (Iowa 2014); Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So.3d 649
(Ala. 2014).
284. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009).
285. Levine, 555 U.S. at 574–75.
286. Leigh Ann Caldwell, Neil Gorsuch Confirmed to Supreme Court After Senate Uses ‘Nuclear
Option,’ NBC NEWS (April 7, 2017 11:57 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/neilgorsuch-confirmed-supreme-court-after-senate-uses-nuclear-option-n743766; Clare Foran and Stephen
Collinson, Brett Kavanaugh sworn in as Supreme Court justice, CNN politics (Oct. 6, 2018 8:02 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/06/politics/kavanaugh-final-confirmation-vote/index.html.
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(April
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2018
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state claims pertaining to this field.288 As Congressional intent is the “ultimate
touchstone” for preemption analysis,289 the lack of clear Congressional intent to
preempt mislabeling state law actions indicates that there should be no federal
preemption in these instances.290 Additionally, as evidenced by multiple cases,
the language of the federal regulations provide means by which state tort claims
can be successfully brought against name-brand medication manufacturers.291 As
it is challenging to discern any sign that Congress intended to preempt state
claims, under traditional canons of construction,292 it is appropriate to argue that
Congress lacked such intention.
Second, the history surrounding regulation of medication demonstrates that
state and federal rules have long been used in tandem to further promote
consumer safety.293 Almost equally important as Congressional intent is the
presumption against federal preemption when Congress legislates in a field that
has traditionally been occupied by the states.294 When there are decades of
precedent demonstrating that state tort claims help to further the federal goal of
protecting medication consumers, there is an added indicia in favor of allowing
such tort claims to remain in effect.295 It has been common practice to allow state
claims as they “necessarily perform an important remedial role in compensating
accident victims.”296 Apparently understanding the important role that tort claims
play, Congress drafted the FDCA and its amendments in a manner that does not
offend the traditional means of judicial remedy.297 Congress did not establish a
federal cause of action for damages, ostensibly because state tort law claims
already provide injured consumers an opportunity to hold manufacturers of
harmful medications liable.298 This conduct by Congress further demonstrates
that it had no intention of preempting state claims that effectuate state police
powers and have long been the primary remedy for injured defective medication
consumers.

288. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984); S. Rep. No. 98-529 (1984).
289. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
504, 516 (1992) (citing Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)).
290. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1518 (1984); S. REP. NO. 98-5529 (1984); Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472 (2013).
291. See generally Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353 (Iowa 2014); Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So.
3d 649 (Ala. 2014).
292. Macey & Miller, The Cannons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45 YALE L.
SCH. FAC. SCHOLARSHIP SERIES, 647–72, (1992).
293. Bartlett, 570 U.S. at 498 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Levine, 555 U. S. at 566–68, 574.
294. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485.
295. Bartlett, 570 U.S. at 496 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
296. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64 (2002).
297. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984).
298. Bartlett, 570 U.S. at 501 (citing Levine, 555 U.S. at 574–75).
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As noted in Cipollone, the most viable claim in cases dealing with
inadequate warning labels is misrepresentation, particularly when there is some
degree of fraud or concealment involved.299 The Court determined that allowing
mislabeling and misrepresentation claims to be actionable at the state level
helped effectuate the goals of federal regulatory consumer protections.300 By
utilizing the approach recommended in this paper, which embodies a small
portion of the Cipollone reasoning, courts will permit the continuance of a
venerable alliance between federal and state consumer protections. Additionally,
applying longstanding case law, the high court in Alabama also recognized the
importance of providing both federal and state protections for consumers of
medication.301 Although subsequently abridged by legislative action, the Weeks
decision valuably emphasized that instead of inhibiting federal regulations, state
tort claims can be utilized along with federal regulations to improve consumer
safety, aid in establishing a cooperative relationship between name-brand
manufacturers and generic manufacturers, and clarify the connection between
name-brand manufacturers and the consumers of generic medication.302
V. EFFECT ON POLICY
As with any change in the legal system, there are policy implications that
surround whether name-brand manufacturers should be held liable for harms
suffered by consumers of mislabeled generic medication.303 The main thrust of
the argument for name-brand manufacturer liability is focused on protecting
people who, at the moment, have no way to protect themselves.304 The contrary
argument is that name-brand manufacturer liability should not be permitted
because allowing such liability would have negative effects on the
pharmaceutical supply market and that plaintiffs cannot establish that the
defendant’s actions were the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, therefore the court
has no authority to impose liability.305 This argument is fallible because in cases
involving inadequate medication warning labels, it is the misrepresentation by
the name-brand manufacturer, not solely the medication itself, that is a factual
cause of the plaintiff’s harm. Therefore, because the name-brand manufacturer
does indeed cause the harm in inadequate warning cases, there would be
authority for a court to impose liability.
299. 505 U.S. at 529 (concluding that “the phrase ‘based on smoking and health’ fairly but narrowly
construed does not encompass the more general duty not to make fraudulent statements. Accordingly,
petitioner’s claim based on allegedly fraudulent statements made in respondents’ advertisements is not
pre-empted by § 5(b) of the 1969 Act).
300. Id.
301. Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So.3d 649, 676 (Ala. 2014).
302. Id. at 661, 677.
303. George Mason Law & Economics Center, supra note 261.
304. Id.
305. Id.; Wolfman & King, supra note 1.
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Allowing for name-brand manufacturer liability will have a meaningful
impact in terms of both loss distribution and loss minimization.306 Loss
distribution involves assigning liability, within the constraints of the governing
legal framework, on the party that is responsible for the harm and most able to
shoulder the financial burden.307 As the law stands now, the party that must pay
the heavy price of harmful inadequate generic medications are the injured
consumers.308 This result offends notions of loss distribution, as the harmed
consumers are neither the party responsible for causing the injury nor are they
best positioned to address the economic challenges associated with the pecuniary
loss.309 While assessing liability on the generic manufacturer would demonstrate
sound loss distribution principles, doing so is impermissible.310 In cases
involving mislabeled medications, federal regulations disallow generic
manufacturer liability due to impossibility preemption.311 This leaves only namebrand manufacturers as viable candidates to assume the liability burden. They
are in the best position to know the dangers associated with the medication,
monitor the labeling process, correct faulty labels, and purchase insurance to
protect against tort liability.312
There are also significant positive loss minimization effects that this form
of tort liability would provide. Loss minimization involves introducing
incentives that help to minimize the general risk of harm and loss to society. 313
Knowing they will be on-the-hook for harms to generic consumers, name-brand
manufacturers would be incentivized to take additional precautions to ensure that
consumers are properly informed of the potential risks associated with a
medication. Taking such precautionary measures likely would not constitute an
excessive burden for the name-brand manufacturers.314 To minimize liability
risk, they would merely need to update labels whenever a new dangerous side
effect is identified and purchase adequate insurance for occasions when they fail
to identify an issue before it causes harm.315 Due to federal regulation, the generic
manufactures would then be required to adjust their labels to match the name306. SHULMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 18.
307. Id.
308. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984).
309. SHULMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 121.
310. Id.; Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472 (2013); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564
U.S. 604 (2011); Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353 (Iowa 2014); Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So.3d
649 (Ala. 2014).
311. See generally Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472; PLIVA, 564 U.S. 604; Huck, 850 N.W.2d 353; Weeks, 159
So.3d 649.
312. T.H. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 407 P.3d 18 (Cal. 2017).
313. SHULMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 17.
314. See infra text accompanying note 292.
315. See supra Part III (detailing how manufacturers were found liable and what could have prevented
such liability).
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brand warning language.316 Even if the costs are significant, the name-brand
manufacturers are most prepared to complete the necessary testing, updating, and
re-labeling of the name-brand product.317 As name-brand manufacturers already
have the knowledge, procedures and capital required for testing, they are best
positioned to address any need for additional research on potential negative sideeffects and understand what type of insurance will be most appropriate to protect
against potential liabilities. This approach also creates an additional incentive for
name-brand manufacturers to provide comprehensive warnings that allow
consumers to make informed decisions about whether they will use a
medication.318 If forced to bear this burden, name-brand manufacturers will
surely take steps to minimize their liability exposure, thereby reducing risks to
all consumers and aiding with loss minimization. While inconvenient for the
well-insulated name-brand manufacturers, this form of liability is the clearest
way to apply existing tort principles in a fashion that provides access to justice
for consumers injured by inadequate warnings on generic medication.
Critics will argue that this form of liability could cripple the pharmaceutical
market, which directly frustrates the purpose of the FDCA and its
amendments.319 The primary fear would be that name-brand manufacturers may
exit the pharmaceutical market due to the increase in potential liability.320 While
increased liability risk could reduce potential profits, and reduced financial gain
can cause a company to leave a given industry, the earnings in Big Pharma321
don’t reflect a legitimate concern of vanishing profits.322 In fact, federal
regulatory penalties and law suit awards in the multi-billion dollar range have
not deterred companies from remaining in the medication marketspace.323 While
the drug approval process is time consuming, pharmaceutical companies are
handsomely rewarded for their efforts.324 It seems unreasonable to suppose that
316. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984).
317. Ossining Union Free School Dist. v. Anderson, 539 N.E.2d 91 (N.Y. 1989).
318. The incentive being the ability to reduce potential litigation risks and the related costs of
litigation.
319. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984).
320. George Mason Law & Economics Center, supra npte 261.
321. Big Pharma, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (August 1, 2018) (providing the
following definition for Big Pharma: “meaning large pharmaceutical companies considered especially as
a politically influential group”).
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the relatively insignificant costs of ensuring name-brand manufacturer’s own
labels are accurate will force companies that are experiencing near record-high
profits to shut down.325 Importantly, as explained in Huck, if the name-brand
company did update their labels, but the generic company failed to follow suit,
the name-brand company would be protected from liability because injured
generic medication consumers would be able to levy a claim directly against the
generic manufacturer.326 While it is clear that updating labels will involve a
number of additional costs, these costs likely will only amount to a “drop in the
bucket” compared to the massive returns that companies realize from good
investments in pharmaceuticals.327
As it is vitally important that pharmaceutical companies stay engaged in
the furtherance of modern medicine, name-brand manufacturer liability is not
aimed at damaging the pharmaceutical market.328 The effect of this legal theory
is to hold those responsible for harm liable for damages they have caused. The
added level of corporate responsibility and safeguards may actually lead to
greater consumer demand for medications, as consumers will know that they are
adequately protected.329 Presently, the party left worse-off in these cases is the
consumer who is injured by incorrect medication warnings that do not contain
ample information about side-effects.330 Up to this point, consumers have largely
only been able to recover for their suffering if they ingested the name-brand
version.331 In most jurisdictions today, if a consumer is harmed by inadequate
warnings for a generic medication, they are almost certainly without a legal
remedy.332 This is the case even though it is not the consumer who creates the
contents of the label, nor is it the generic manufacturer.333 The only party that
has creative control over the contents of the warning labels in these instances is
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the name-brand manufacturer.334 While the name-brand manufacturer has been
responsible for creating the harms suffered, only the generic drug consumer has
been forced to grapple with the painful side-effects of inadequate warning labels.
VI. CONCLUSION
While potentially uncomfortable for name-brand manufacturers, this
combined application of the well-settled tort principles applied in May, Levine,
Cipollone, T.H., Rafferty, and Weeks provides a means by which countless
plaintiffs can receive the redress they so desperately need. Although this form of
liability may affront stalwart defenders of Big Pharma, it should be given
credence. This approach is novel in that it simultaneously (i) asserts
foreseeability’s prime importance in determining when a duty is owed, (ii)
demonstrates how a name-brand manufacturer can cause harm to a generic
consumer through providing inadequate warnings, (iii) argues that federal and
state consumer protections should act in unison, (iv) dutifully abides by the
cornerstones of preemption; Congressional intent and recognition of the
importance that state police powers are not infringed upon, and (v) reiterates that
misrepresentation claims are not preempted by federal regulation. While not
often used in this combination, these principles have found support at almost
every level of the judicial system and can now be applied jointly to address a
very real need. Courts can comfortably apply this framework knowing that it is
grounded in well-settled tort law principles that have been recognized and
reaffirmed for decades. Hopefully, this approach will ease the debilitating
symptoms of evolving tort liability.

334. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 10.

